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The Law and Social Work
HENRY H. FosTEm, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The art of communication is becoming increasingly difficult
in this era of over-specialization and fragmentation of learning.
It used to be that lawyers were authentic "jacks of all trades,"
but today perhaps the social worker more nearly fits that descrip-
tion, although both of our professions are split up into specialties.
There seems to be a mania for splitting things, whether they be
hairs, atoms, infinitives, or fees. Communication failure leads
to misunderstanding or impedes understanding, and over-special-
ization, I suspect, leads to an intellectual provincialism. To a
great extent the friction between our professions arises due to
corresponding narrow points of view and a failure to understand
the problems and perspective of each other's profession. In our
quest for technical expertness we may have neglected the art of
empathy and thus spawned technicians rather than well-rounded
professionals.
Although I would not decry specialization in many fields,
and perhaps would regard it as inevitable and socially useful,
it is achieved at a high cost in terms of human values. Where
we are dealing with human beings and social problems, too nar-
row a training leads to the error committed by the three blind
men from Pakistan who examined the elephant. If our education
has consisted of narrow classification of subject matter into tight
little compartments, isolated and secure from exposure to outside
influences and ideas, the result is a sequestration of knowledge,
a "hardening of the categories," and a divorce from reality. Even
though we would disagree on the ideal curriculum for a law
school or a school of social work, I believe we share an appreci-
ation of the need for an integration of knowledge and experience.
Assuming that we are professionals and persons of good will,
*Professor of Law, New York University. The substance of this article was
presented as a paper before the 1964 Alumni Conference of the Columbia School
of Social Work.
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and that law, social work, and social action are here to stay, it
is mutually important that we apprehend the social functions
of our professions and examine the image we have of the lawyer
and the social worker.' For many centuries law has been a craft
with inherited traditions and ways of doing things. To under-
stand the lawyer we must consider his education.
EDUCATION, IMAGES AND VALUES
Legal education. In the seventeenth century, after a period
of unlicensed open shop practice of law by amateurs armed with
prayer books, secularization of the law was reestablished and
formal training for the bar became essential.' Initially such
training took the form of law office apprenticeship, although a
few well-to-do sons studied at the Inns of court in London. After
the Revolution, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy espoused
the notion that any person of good character was entitled to prac-
tice law.3 The first professional and university afliated law school
was founded at Harvard in 1817. It did not amount to much until
Justice Story reorganized it in 1829, and its present eminence
dates from Dean Langdell's installation of the case method of
study in the 1870's.4
Now the case method of study in some measure explains how
lawyers get that way. Those of you who have participated in its
socratic dialogue and unique manner of study and presentation
may appreciate how it sharpens analysis and teaches the student
to "strike for the jugular." With the possible exception of rigorous
training in the subject of logic, I know of no educational equiv-
alent to the painstaking hair splitting of the freshman law course.
We contend, somewhat immodestly but I hope accurately, that
we teach our freshman to "think straight." But there are side
effects. One danger is that the law student may forget that logic
is a tool rather than an end in itself. As Holmes once said, "The
1 The author has made more extended comments about the legal profession
and legal education in Davis, Foster, Jeffery and Davis, Society and the Law,
chapters 4, 9 and 10 (1962).
2 For a significant study of legal education and attempts to infuse social
science material into the law school curriculum, see Currie, The Materials of Law
Study, 3 J. Legal Ed. 331 (1951), and 8 J. Legal Ed. 1 (1955).
3 For a brief history of the legal profession, see Pound, The Lawyer from
Antiquity to Modern Times (1953).
4 For the history of the Harvard Law School, see Centennial History of the
Harvard Law School, published by the Harvard Law School Association (1918).
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whole outline of the law is the resultant of a conflict at every point
betveen logic and good sense.", If we fail to appreciate that social
advantage is the inarticulate major premise for decision, the re-
sult may be that the law is dehumanized."
An even greater danger is that the case method of study by
separating law from its social context will lead to what Pound
has called mechanistic jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of the
United States, from the 1890's to 1937, in its development of
substantive due process so as to preclude social and economic
experimentation, 7 reflected the political value or judgments which
flow not only from a laissez faire philosophy but also a mechan-
istic jurisprudence of conceptualism, that was nurtured by the
education of the justices. It was not until his heretical address
to the American Bar Association in 1906 that Pound convinced
some legal educators that law should be viewed as one means
of social control and should be judged, at least in part, in terms
of the consequences of decision.
Sociological jurisprudence attracted a few isolated champions
from the bench, bar, and the law schools. It remained for Co-
lumbia Law School, however, to make an all out effort to inte-
grate the social sciences into the law school curriculum. Under
the direction of Leon C. Marshall, a professor of Political Eco-
nomics, borrowed from the University of Chicago, the Columbia
law faculty started extended weekly study sessions in 1926. The
thesis was: Since law is a means of social control, it ought to be
studied as such, and in order to do that, the law curriculum
must be reorganized along functional lines so that the subject
corresponds with the type of human activity involved, and the
findings and insights of the social sciences, where relevant, must
be integrated into the legal materials.8
';Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 50 (1920).6
'Law must not become too scientific for the people to appreciate its
workdng. Law has the practical fumction of adjusting every day relations so as
to meet current ideas of fair play. It must not become so completely artificial
that the public is led to believe it is wholly arbitrary." Pound, Mechanical Juris-
prudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. at 606 (1908).7 For a description of the evolution of substantive due process, see Kauper,
Frontiers of Constitutional Liberty (1956).SThen Dean Stone described the prospectus for revising the law curriculum
as follows: "We have failed to recognize as clearly as we might that law is
nothing more than a form of social control intimately related to those social
functions which are the subject matter of economics and social sciences gen-
erally . . . [that] the (law) student, in order to be adequately prepared for its
(Continued on next page)
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It is not relevant to our present discussion to make extended
comment upon the failure of the Columbia study. It is sufficient
to point out that after Dean Harlan Fiske Stone left for Wash-
ington, the imaginative and ambitious undertaking of the Co-
lumbia innovators was abandoned, even though a measure of
glory was achieved. From the Columbia study came the format
of the modem "cases and materials" that rendered obsolete the
old sterile collection of cases. As a bonus, we received several
notable inter-disciplinary studies which today have the status of
classics. The course of legal education was altered but not revo-
lutionized. Today at our better law schools there are versatile
professors who combine technical skill and broad knowledge.
Images. Both the legal profession and social work have been
victimized by stereotypes, and, as we know from Thurman
Arnold and Stuart Chase, labels can be tyrannical. I may not be
full bright but I hope I am forthright if I try to think the un-
thinkable. My thought is that there are myths which we have
confused with reality. To the extent we can safely generalize, I
believe we may say that there are few accurate generalizations
to be made about the individuals in our professions, as distin-
guished from the professions themselves as social institutions.
I suppose that the popular image of the lawyer is a mouth-
piece who bests an inept district attorney, or at the other extreme,
a hypertechnical ribbon clerk or "sea lawyer" who complicates
what otherwise would be a serene existence. The social worker
fares no better. The myth is that he, or more often she, is a
snooping busybody or do-gooder who on the one hand throws
away the taxpayer's money, and on the other tries to regiment
the lives of the distressed dispossessed. Note that the lawyer
conjures up a father figure and the social worker a mother figure,
but both are cloaked with parental authoritarianess.
As for the lawyer, I merely would point out that the trial
lawyer is no more the prototype of the legal profession than the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
study ought, not only to have good mental discipline, but he ought to have a
thorough-going knowledge of the social functions with which the law deals."
Stone, The Future of Legal Education, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 234, (1924). See also
Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification, 23 Colum. L. Rev.
319 (1923).
9For example, Jerome Hall's Theft, Law and Society (1935); Berle and
Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1934); and Llewellyn
and Hoebel's The Cheyenne Way (1941).
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brain surgeon typifies medicine. Over 90% of criminal cases
involve guilty pleas, 96% of New York divorces are uncontested,
and less than 5% of personal injury cases go to jury verdict.
Whole industries resort to arbitration. Most lawyers in practicing
their craft spend most of their time in negotiating, counseling,
drafting documents, and planning business and personal affairs
for the future. Law firms tend to create specialties within special-
ties, and trial work is assigned to a numerically small but im-
portant division of the firm. A substantial part of the law business
is transacted outside of the adversary process. Moverover, de-
pending upon economic conditions and opportunities, our law
school graduates may as often drift into government or business
as into active practice. In short, the legal profession is tremen-
dously diversified, and lawyers tend to be so extremely individu-
alistic that their differences outweigh their similarities.
It is a common phenomenon that although we may have a low
opinion of a class or group, we regard some of its members as
exceptions that prove the rule. This is true of law, social work,
and perhaps medicine. It reminds me of the story of the Phila-
delphia rabbi who was deploring proscelyting and the loss of
many members of his congregation to the Quakers. He remarked
that it had reached the point that some of his best Jews were
friendsl The point, of course, is that most social workers can think
of many lawyers who are useful members of boards or agencies
concerned with social welfare work, and probably regard them as
dedicated and competent, yet at the same time they may feel
that lawyers as a class are obstructionists.
Values. Why should lawyers as a class project an image of
obfuscation? May I suggest that at least in part it is due to
the lawyer's concern with what is called the "rule of law." This
magical phrase, sometimes also expressed as "due process of law"
or "law of the land," has the Pavlovian effect on lawyers that
"human dignity" or "social welfare" has on social workers. We
may disagree about a specific application of the "rule of law"
but we are sure that the rule itself is valid for all times and all
places. At a minimum, the rule of law means that everyone
affected by legal decision is entitled to his day in court before an
independent and unbiased judge who will make a rational deci-
sion based on the facts presented. It also means that the rules
1965]
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of law apply to everyone, to public officials as well as to the
ordinary citizen. Through the political device we call the doe-
trine of separation of powers, we divide the functions of law
enforcement from adjudication. This is one of the great social
inventions of the Anglo-American system. Rules of law are
addressed to the police, wardens, and the judge himself is bound
by them, so it is no wonder that lawyers insist that administrators,
bureaucrats and public agents of all sorts must abide by due
process. Sir Edward Coke, on a memorable occasion, told even
a Stuart king that he was under "God and the law,"'" and later
informed Parliament its statutes were unconstitutional if "against
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be per-
formed.""
What is this process that must be "due"? Why is procedure
important? The "process" referred to is that of government. The
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
relate only to government action and to state activity. It is a limi-
tation on government. Justice Douglas has pointed out that "It is
not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the
difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice.
Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main
assurance that there will be equal justice under law." 2 In a rare
instance, Mr. Justice Frankfurter agrees with his colleague's em-
phasis and in another case observed that "The history of American
freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure."'3
So it is that what may seem to be red tape, legalistic form-
alism, may in reality be of substantive importance as well. Pro-
cedure or red tape is essential whether it be baseball, chess,
artistic composition, or the administration of justice. Procedure
is to law what the "scientific method" is to science.
Perhaps it would be an aid to understanding if we would
select a specific example and descend to a lower level of ab-
stractions. Lawyers are very much aware of that rule of evidence
lo For an extremely interesting biography of Coke, see Bowen, The Lion
and the Throne (1957).11 Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 118a (1610).
1 2 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179
(1951).
13 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945).
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we call the "hearsay rule." The general idea behind the rule is
that evidence not proceeding from the personal knowledge of a
witness, but from the mere repetition of what he has heard others
say, is lacking in reliability and probative value. Although at last
count there were some thirty four exceptions to the heresay rule
so that its status as a general rule is in doubt, nonetheless on the
grounds of logic and human experience it deserves respect. It is
not merely a matter of red tape. Permit me to quote from a
psychiatrist who is commenting on agency records involving
adoption:
There was an amazing difference between these two groups
of records. Those in which adoption was contemplated clearly
had been studied more thoroughly, the data were well organ-
ized, and well articulated goals and procedures for handling
were set forth. The foster care records, on the other hand,
were chaotic and nearly impossible to analyze in any detail.
The same workers had handled both sets. It was obvious that
mere awareness that the adoption cases were to be subjected
to an adversary procedure with a judge evaluating the data
was sufficient to increase professional proficiency. It was ap-
parent that the impact of authoritative surveillance is of some
importance, even to professionals.14
I would go further than my psychiatrist friend. Not only is
what he called surveillance important-even to professionals-
it is the very core of our democratic system. Checks and balances
and its concomitant separation of powers doctine is the matrix
of a free society. The problem remains whether or not we can
reconcile these attributes of the rule of law with what has been
called the welfare state, or whether we must subscribe to the
pessimism of Hayek who says "any policy aiming directly at a
substantive ideal of distributive justice must lead to the destruc-
tion of the Rule of Law." 5
Tim R L. OF LAw AND TmH W=_IARE STATE
First of all, it should be noted that a convincing rebuttal to
Hayek's thesis has been given by Professor Harry W. Jones, who
points out that mature legal systems have never been as blind to
14 Watson, Family Law and Its Challenge for Psychiatry, 2 J. Family Law 71,
82 (1962).
'
5 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 79 (1945).
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distributive justice as Hayek makes out."0 The common law
contains many examples of "distributive justice," so many that
economic determinists are confounded by its humanity and social
concern. We may regret particular cases and individual doctrines,
for example the feudalistic origin and carry overs into the law
of property, or the ecclesiastical antecedents of marriage and
divorce law, but the fact that emerges from legal history is the
conciliatory and reasonable character and pragmatic method
of the common law as it builds case by case, equity by equity.
The values of the time and place, the situation of the parties
and the consequences of decision, including social advantage,
are reflected by the case law.
Contrary to Hayek, it is my conviction that only by serving
the ideal of what he calls "distributive justice" or what I would
call "social advantage" will the rule of law be preserved and
secure. The most serious recent threat to the Supreme Court as
an institution came during the days of the New Deal when by
paying false homage to the rule of law it frustrated welfare
legislation. Hayek looks at only one side of federalism, that in-
volving limitations upon government. He does not countenance
the other side of her face, namely that side which Robert Hutch-
ins calls "liberty under law" or the face of freedom which is seen
by those interested in achievement. 7 From that vantage point
the first question is whether the people can do for themselves
what ought to be done. Instead of government being paralyzed
so that individuals may be free, power is allocated according
to law and subject to checks and balances. Hutchins notes that
we need both faces of federalism, but that the first has domin-
ated our talking and the second our way of acting.
Roscoe Pound has taught us that the function of law is the
satisfaction of a maximum of human wants and desires with a
minimum of friction and waste. This process he calls "social
engineering." One characteristic of law in the twentieth cen-
tnry is its emphasis on the social interest in the individual. It
is the difficult task of law to bring about a balance and adjust-
ment between conflicting assertions of freedom so that from a
16 Jones, The Rule of Law in the Welfare State, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 143(1958), cites several examples, including the law of infants, bankruptcy legisla-
tion, homestead exemptions, water rights, etc.
17 See Hutchins, Two Faces of Federalism (1961).
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utilitarian point of view a maximum of freedom is enjoyed by all,
license by none. If a liberty is subtracted from one person or
group, it may augment the liberty of another person or group.
The delicate task is to achieve equilibrium and to avoid an over-
concentration of rights in one group because of the restraint
that is thereby imposed on other groups.' If one group achieves
a monopoly of rights or a super-abundance of freedom, neces-
sarily at the expense of others, the excess becomes power or
license, and the familiar dicta of Lord Acton is then applicable.'9
From this standpoint the judicial process becomes one of adjust-
ment and compromise and rights and duties, instead of being
"absolutes," are qualified by the overriding demands of society
and the claims of other individuals. Paradoxically, freedom im-
plies restraint. To be free there must be restraint, and perhaps
restraint of restraint.
In dissenting from Hayek's misconception of the rule of law,
however, it does not follow that we should ignore his warning.
Those of us who believe that a democratic government has the
power and obligation to fulfill the needs of its citizens and to
serve humanitarian ends, should be alert to the dangers of abuse
and officiousness. Discretion should be subject to the check and
balance of meaningful statutory standards, fair and realistic pro-
cedure, and judicial review. For as pointed out by Harry Jones,
as social justice becomes a conscious end of government policy
the ordinary citizen comes into more frequent contact with
regulatory authority, and "It is the task of the rule of law to see
to it that these multiplied and diverse encounters are as fair,
as just, and as free from arbitrariness as are the familiar encount-
ers of the right-asserting private citizen with the judicial officers
of the traditional law."2 Thus the rule of law and the welfare
state may be reconciled by a merger appropriate to the circum-
18 See Foster, The Relation and Correlation of Freedom and Security, 58
W. Va. L. Rev. 325 (1956).
19 Jones, op. cit. supra note 16, 147 n.8, gives the full quotation as follows:
"I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike other
men, with a favorable presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any
presumption it is the other way against holders of power, increasing as the power
increases. Historic responsibility has to make up for the want of legal responsi-
bility. Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great
men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not
authority: still more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of cor-
ruption by authority." Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power 335-336 (1955).2o Jones, op. cit. supra note 16, at 156.
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stances, and it is not as Hayek would have it, a case of total
destruction of one or the other.
PRESENT AND FUuRE INTER-BELATIoNSHIP BETwE=
LAw AND SocA.L WoRx
From what I have said, it should be clear that I see and
anticipate a very close cooperation between lawyers and social
workers. In some instances the law of the past will give way so
as to permit the fulfillment of present needs. At the same time,
law trained people will remain adamant in their commitment to
the essentials of due process. Moreover, we have a built in
skepticism of administrators, executives, bureaucrats, and com-
misars. We are suspicious of short cuts and unchecked discre-
tion, of evidence taken outside of the record, and we value con-
frontation and the chance to refute.
It is this latter commitment that may be difficult for others
to comprehend. To the social scientist, a system that requires
partisan presentation and employs adversary procedure may seem
utterly "unscientific." Admittedly, the contention of a courtroom
is far removed from the objectivity of the laboratory. But it
should be remembered that a trial serves several functions in
addition to that of discovering "truth." Historically, it is a sub-
stitute for self-help, the blood feud, and composition (bots and
wers), and it must serve as a satisfactory alternative or there
may be an atavistic return to lynch law or the vigilantes. In
addition, trials may serve educational or recreational functions.
I suspect that some of the celebrated English trials during the
Stuarts had a greater affect in influencing the thinking of our
founding fathers who drafted the Bill of Rights than did the
writings of Locke and the French romanticists.21
As lawyers, we may be practically alone in our preference for
adversary procedure, which had been our chief mode of opera-
tion since before Christ. It should be noted, however, that the
client ordinarily wants and needs a lawyer who is his champion,
not a representative of the public at large. One who is accused
of crime or involved in an important civil dispute does not seek
21 See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law (1955).
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an impartial and objective counsel, he wants someone who will
protect and further his interests even at the expense of others.
Under our division of labor, it is for the court or jury to protect
and further the larger public interest. I know that all of this seems
barbaric to men of science, but centuries of experience convinces
us that "truth" more often than not does emerge from the ad-
versary process and that cross-examination, of even the most
eminent expert, is one of the most effective means devised by
man for getting at the truth and discouraging falsehood and
unconscionable exaggeration.
Having stated our commitment and having confessed our
bias, I hasten to concede that there are many places where law
and society would profit by an abandonment or modification of
the adversary system. In making such a concession, I realize
that to some of my brethren I preach heresy. But by now it should
be apparent that the adversary process in its traditional form is
ill suited for some types of problems. To function well, the ad-
versary process requires leisure and a light case load. In urban
areas, the administration of justice is in greatest disrepute where
the traffic is the heaviest. The police or magistrate's court, the
support court, the personal injury action, and sometimes the
family court, come in for most of the criticism. These are all
areas where staggering caseloads may be on the dockets, where
queues of parties may be lined up, where assembly line justice
is most apt to be meted out. Tragically, they are the most fre-
quent points of contact for the citizen and the courts.
If the administration of justice in urban communities has
reached the sad state I suggest, what is the remedy?2 2 The
remedy most often employed is by one means or the other to
bring about an informal disposition of the bulk of cases, leaving
the hard core for the court to formally adjudicate. Where this
is done, it means that staff rather than the judge process the
matter. It means that an investigatorial and a counseling func-
tion supersede the adversary process. It means that social work-
ers rather than law trained personnel become decision makers and
problem solvers, that intake and probation become integral de-
partments of the court set up. The case worker and her note-
22 The most thorough socio-legal study of court congestion is that by Zeisel,
Kalven and Bucholz, Delay in the Court (1959).
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book may embody as much law as there is at the end of the
policeman's proverbial nightstickl
But again, to refer back to the principle of rule of law, there
are inherent dangers in notebooks or nightsticks. Either may be
a dangerous weapon. There must be checks and balances. The
history of the juvenile court in America affords an example.
When the combined efforts of lawyers and social workers led
to the establishment of the first juvenile court in Cook County
some sixty-five years ago, the immediate problem was to spare
youthful offenders from the traumatic affect of the criminal
courts. Although I have nothing but admiration for the many
fine juvenile courts we have in this country today, I also am
aware that in too many instances their promise has not been
fulfilled, usually because of inadequate resources or personnel.
The broad discretion accorded such courts has been a mixed
blessing. A legalistic judge assigned on rotation may convert
such a court into an oppressive institution, a weak judge may
abdicate judicial functions and become a mere figurehead. What
is needed, of course, is an interdisciplinary team effort.
Hopefully, the latest modification of judicial structure, the
family court, will guard against some of the abuses, real or
potential, that have plagued some juvenile courts. It is note-
worthy that in New York, again due to the concerted effort of
our two professions, there was a reorganization of courts and
procedure so as to meet current family needs. Walter Gelihorn,
and the special committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, demonstrated that research of outstanding quality
could bring about significant reform.23 Perhaps a similar pooling
of inter-professional resources might even lead to a much needed
reform of the substantive law of divorce, although probably that
is wishful thinking.24
For the new family court to function effectively it must
secure sufficient and divers personnel from the ranks of the
social work profession. Therapists, counselors, probation officers,
case workers, and others must be acquired, and induced to work
in the court setting. Successful operation of the court is con-
2 3 Gellhorn, Children and Families in the Courts of New York City (1954),
contains the study and the report of the committee.
24 The best recent review of New York divorce law is that by Blake, The Road
to Reno (1962).
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tingent upon the adequacy and competence of such personnel.
The same wvill be true, when and if counseling services become
an integral part of the procedure in divorce cases. Criminal
courts, also, for effective operation must have adequate personnel
for the important investigation and probation work that is so
essential for the administration of the criminal law.
Thus we see that there are many points of contact between
law and social work, that specialized courts are dependent upon
effective social work assistance, and that the law has come to
modify adversary procedure and courts today provide auxiliary
services. In the court setting, final responsibility must rest with
the court and social work practice must be adapted to meet
judicial imperatives.
Be that as it may, in some other areas it is the law which has
given way to the philosophy or needs of social work. This is
manifest in much of the legislation relating to welfare and public
assistance. Professor tenBroek of California in a fascinating
article discusses The Impact of Welfare Law Upon Family Law.
He observes that:
In the creation of our present welfare system, however, welfare
planners and legislators did not pause to reconsider the value
and reassess the relevance of accepted legal doctrines in these
areas. On the contrary, they accepted those doctrines lock,
stock and barrel. They built the welfare system upon them.
They shaped, trimmed and hewed the system to fit around
them. The doctrines lurk in every silent presupposition and
every explicit provision. They govern eligibility. They de-
termine the amount of the grant. They are the heart and soul
of the means test.25
Professor tenBroek then notes the legislative and decisional
changes that occurred and how family law gave ground to
welfare principles. He says:
From these beginnings, however, many changes have been
wrought. The basic anomalies and incompatabilities between
these legal notions and welfare principles, while not resolved
by a sweeping original act, have undergone a continuous
process of adjustment. Through a progressive series of modi-
fications, the legal notions have given way to the welfare




principles. In various areas and to various degrees, the law
of domestic relations has yielded to welfare law.20
As examples, he cites the modification of the community
property regime and the tendency to regard all property as a
resource, whether called community or separate, the rejection
of the common law distinction between a trailer affixed to the
realty and one on wheels, the fact that the recipient of Old Age
and Survivor's Insurance is not required, and in some circum-
stances is not permitted to divide equally with the spouse, and
the imposition of a support obligation that did not exist at com-
mon law as to some relatives who nonetheless now come within
the statutory duty. It should be noted that these are not casual
modifications but involve an alteration of significant legal rules.
But there are other areas of the law where as yet social work
philosophy has not had the affect of ameliorating obsolete legal
principles. I have in mind the attitude of many courts in custody
cases where too often the matter is treated as if it were a dispute
over property, as if there were a covenant running with the
child, and the focus is on whether or not a litigant's behavior
has been bad enough to forfeit rights, rather than on the real
best interests of the child. I am appalled by the paucity of
facts related in some opinions and by the reasoning adopted by
some judges. Surely investigation and reports by experts in
behavioral science are essential if we are to serve the best
interests of the child, and the child's welfare should be the
dominant consideration in all cases.20
It is my impression that in adoption cases, as contrasted with
custody awards, courts today place greater reliance upon staff and
agency investigations and reports. Adoption proceedings rarely
involve a contest or adversary procedure although such may come
later. This difference as to the role of the case worker in dif-
ferent types of proceedings is to be expected even though when
viewed objectively a custody case presents much the same social
27 See Foster and Freed, Child Custody, 89 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 428, and 89N.Y.U.L. Rev. 615 (1984).528 Such was declared to be the law by Judge Cardozo in Finlay v. Finlay,
240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925), and by later Justice Brewer in Chapsky
v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 40 Am. Re . 821 (1881), but at the present time New
York and many states apply the best interests tests only to contests between
natural parents and require proof of parental unfitness in a contest with a
non-parent. See Simpson, The Unfit Parent, 89 U. Det. L.J. 847 (1962).
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problem as does an adoption case. Unfortunately, courts some-
times have difficulty in seeing that they are confronted with social
problems and that society's interest should prevail even when
the matter is presented within the adversary framework. It is
interesting that one of the first statements adopted by the
National Conference of Lawyers and Social Workers (January 30,
1963)2 9 was one outlining the relevant considerations which
should prevail in adoption cases. Cooperation is easier when the
subject is one that is not resolved in contested cases.
The therapist, such as the psychiatric social worker, also
has many points of contact with law. Whether the therapist is
engaging in marriage counseling or is working with a mental
patient, there should be due regard for the legal rights of the
client. In the performance of counseling, the advice of the
therapist may have an important bearing on such legal matters
as the defense of condonation in divorce suits. There are re-
ciprocal obligations here, however, and the ethical lawyer should
show due regard for the professional status of the therapist and
the work that she is doing.
I would be less than candid if I left with you the impression
that I believed law and social work could marry and live happily
ever after. Sources of irritation, differences in viewpoint, and
vested interests will continue to exist even though we achieve
a reasonably happy liaison. Lawyers will apply their own methods
to interviewing, counseling, mediating, and problem-solving, and
social workers will perform the same functions in their own
way. The lawyer will continue to be preoccupied with individual
liberty and personal rights, and social workers will tend to give
priority to social policy, even though both professions start with
the democratic value of the basic worth and dignity of man.
In addition, there are occupational hazards or diseases that
impede understanding. The judge, like some doctors, may be
afflicted with a "Jehovah's complex" and assume to be omniscient
as well as omnipotent. Hopefully, he may be reversed on appeal.
The caseworker may manifest symptoms of professional insecurity
or suffer "battle fatigue" to such an extent that her work is un-
29 The Conference was formed in May 1962, by the National Association of




professional. Both judge and caseworker may be lacking in
professional qualifications and may have their position as a
result of political patronage.
It is the matter of political patronage that poses a serious
obstacle to effective teamwork. When an inter-disciplinary team
studied the county court in Pittsburgh we found that all mem-
bers of the staff were patronage appointees, that none had a
graduate degree in social work and that only two out of seven-
teen had ever gone to college. They were deserving friends and
relatives of the judges. In Salt Lake City an attempt to build a
family court came to naught due to judicial rigidity, sloppy
social work, and the patronage issue.31 Ordinarily, there must
be an effective merit system in order to attract competent per-
sonnel to government service.
If we look to the future and attempt to forecast inter-profes-
sional cooperation and conflict, we may agree that ours is an
ambivilant relationship. We share many common goals, ideals,
and values, but our training is different and our roles are not
always compatible. It is the obligation of our law schools to try to
socialize the aggressive young men and women who come to us
for training. Justice Brandeis once said "a lawyer who has not
studied economics and sociology is very apt to become a public
enemy."32 In the same speech, in commenting upon the lag
between law and social science, he said that too many judges and
lawyers "think with specialized minds," and that "What we
need is not to displace the courts, but to make them efficient
instruments of justice; not to displace the lawyer, but to fit him
for his official or judicial task." Harlan Fiske Stone made similar
observations as to legal education and the need to give law stu-
dents a balanced diet.33
I hope it is not too presumptious to suggest that students of
31 The story of the Salt Lake City fiasco is told by Bodenheimer, The Utah
Marriage Counseling Experiment, 7 Utah L. Rev. 443 (1961).3 2 Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 Ill. L. Rev. 461, 470 (1916).
38 Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 379 (1956), quotes Stone
to the effect that expert legal scholarship which might otherwise have given
balance to the law student's mental diet, persistently delved into the past- that
there was little or no "reflection upon the relationship of law to social and eco-
nomic forces which produce it." In short, both training and experience taught
the lawyer to regard himself as a "technician rather than an originator of (social)
policy," giving rise to the impression that "the lawyer existed to serve and not
to counsel his clients." Fortunately, Stone's observations no longer hold true, due
to the impact of sociological jurisprudence upon modem legal education.
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social work also should be given a balanced diet, and included on
the menu should be a meaningful course about law that brings
out the social significance of the rule of law and its importance
in a democratic society. The fact that fair procedure and social
welfare are not inconsistent is illustrated by many historic
examples not the least of which is the philosophy and career of
"Freeborn John" Lilburne, the Leveller pamphleteer of the
seventeenth century. 34 Short of revolution, significant social ad-
vance must come by "due" and democratic processes. If the
lawyer seems to be preoccupied with means and the social worker
with ends, perhaps it would be appropriate to concede that both
are important.
The fact is that most intelligent citizens are curious about
that mysterious thing called the law. I encourage your curiosity
and remind you that formerly the law was not esoteric but lay
in the public domain. Edmund Burke remarked about the avid
interest of Americans in law35 and Blackstone delivered his lec-
tures to and wrote his commentaries for Oxford undergraduates.
In the immediate future social workers and lawyers will be called
upon to work together on multi-dimensional levels. As trouble
shooters and problem solvers we will assume leadership in the
mental health program and the war on poverty. Whether we work
together in harmony and are productive depends in large measure
upon our mutual tolerance and appreciation of each others
viewpoint. The professional social worker and the lawyer with a
social conscience already have much in common and the capacity
to learn from one another.
In conclusion, we cite Dean Griswold's emphasis on the
importance of facts which I believe should be heeded by both
law schools and schools of social work. The dean, who for some
time has had an interest in social work as well as law, in the
foreword to a leading book on juvenile delinquency, says:
Law, in any field, to be adequate and sound must rest on
facts. It must grow out of experience. Thus, research designed
34 For a bibliography of this remarkable man, see Gibb, John Lilburne, the
Leveller, a Christian Democrat (1947). See also Wolfram, John Lilburne:
Levellers and Civil Liberties, in Civil Liberties, No. 214, March 1964, published
by the American Civil Liberties Union.35Burke, in his speech On Conciliation With America, remarked that 'In
no country perhaps in the world is the law so general a study.... All who read,
and most do read, endeavor to obtain some smattering of that science."
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to make systematic investigations into human experience be-
comes indispensable to the healthy growth of the law. 6
The greatest contribution of social work to law may be the
gathering and presentation of facts and insights that will enable
our courts to decide cases and issues within the appropriate
social context, and the greatest contribution of law to social
work may be its insistence that the rule of law apply to all
public endeavor. The law needs the facts that careful case work
can provide and social work needs the discipline that the rule of
law imposes upon all of us who labor in a democratic society.
86 Forward in Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck's Unraveling Juvenile Delin-
quency (1950).
